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Book Commentary
ANALYSIS OF SOURCE-A COMMENTARY
ON PROFESSOR SILVING'S SOURCES OF LAW
R. W. M. Dias*
"Source" and "source material" of law is the subject-matter of this
collection of some of Professor Helen Silving's papers.' It should be re-
marked at the outset that these papers should have been revised so as
to take account of recent writings, without which the book wears a
dated air. For instance, no mention is made of Karl N. Llewellyn's
The Common Law Tradition,2 which ought to find a place in any dis-
cussion of statute and precedent; instead there are references to his
Bramble Bush,3 published in 1930, which he himself regarded as a tour
de force of youth. Nor, more seriously, is there any allusion to Lon L.
Fuller's The Morality of Law4 without which any discussion of natural
law is incomplete.
The book first commences with a discussion of statute, precedent and
custom, with particular emphasis on the ideologies and practices in-
volved in them, then proceeds to a consideration of the philosophy of
nature and philosophy of law as sources, rule of law, and ends with an
analysis of the interrelationship between positivism and natural law.
Distributed under these headings are other studies, for instance, of the
English Magna Carta, the Spanish Charta Magna Leonesa and Biblical
equivalents, and also, most interesting of all, of the moral and legal is-
sues involved in the Eichmann affair. This commentary will begin with
an analysis of the positivist-naturalist question since features of this de-
bate, it is submitted, affect one's view of statute, precedent, custom and,
indeed, of sources generally.
The precise significations of "positive" and "natural law" are not at
all clear. The author begins quite properly with the well-known dis-
tinction between the content of natural law and the method of its dis-
* Professor of Law, Magdalene College, Cambridge University, Great Britain.
1. H. SIvING, SOURCES OF LAW (1968). Published by William S. Hein & Co., Buffalo,
New York. Pp. viii, 404. $20.00.
2. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960).
3. K. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH (1930).
4. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
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covery, the former being absolute and existing independently of cog-
nition, the latter being the method of cognition. Positive law prescribes
specific sources and methods which are to be appealed to in identifying
"laws"; that which is extraneous to these specified sources and methods
is natural.5 There is a valuable point to be recognized here. Positive
law and natural law cannot exist without the other; there can be no
natural law without positive law in contrast to which it is natural, and
vice versa.6 The boundary shifts, but is ever-present. So far so good.
But in the context of the conflict between positive and natural law the
former is described as "law which is endowed with a specific machinery
of enforcement and is in fact obeyed and enforced." 7 This definition
can conflict with the previous one, as happens when an obsolete "law",
still identifiable as such with reference to specified sources, is neither
obeyed nor enforced.8 Then again, it is stated that "the 'conflict' be-
tween natural law and the positivist doctrine first arises when the lat-
ter ceases to be positivist and assumes natural law elements." 9 Positi-
vism is said to become a type of natural law when it is erected into an
ideology and judges substitute some contemporary version of it, un-
known to the original legislators, in place of natural reason. 10 Here,
the meaning of "positive" is again different. Another element of con-
fusion is introduced when logic is said to be "a type of 'natural law'
which is logically [sic] inherent in all law."" What does this mean? We
are told immediately that "there is nothing inherent in law which re-
quires it to be logical, reasonable or scientific," but that a "certain
amount of logic is implicit in law, and particularly in law as evolu-
tional reality.' 1 2 If this means that legal reasoning has endeavoured to
be logical in the past and ought therefore to continue to be such, it
raises the whole problem of deriving "ought to be" from what "is" or
"has been"; and if this idea of "ought" is declared "natural", how
should we classify the logic that actually is and has been? Is it positive?
5. H. SILVING, SOURCES OF LAW 256 (1968).
6. Id. at 258.
7. Id. at 267.
8. E.g., trial by battle was still a "legal" method of proof in appeals of murder in
1818, though it had been in disuse for centuries: Ashford v. Thorton, [1818] 1 B. & Ald.
45. In Great Britain today the death penalty incredibly survives as the technical "legal"
penalty for the malicious destruction of Her Majesty's ships, arsenals, dockyards, etc.:
Dockyards Protection Act of 1772, 12 Geo. 3, c. 48. vol. 29. But the penalty is never pro-
nounced, but only "recorded."
9. H. SILVING, SOURCES OF LAW 298 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Erie R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).




The contexts in which such statements as these appear are seeking to
establish different points, but these statements do betray both a lack of
coordination and a lack of clarification concerning the principles com-
prising positivism or natural law.
The author maintains that for the most part there need be no con-
tradiction between natural law and positivism, and with this we must
surely agree. For instance, according to the author, even the most posi-
tivist of assertions, e.g., law is what courts do or will do, need not mili-
tate against a statement that the courts ought to do something other
than what they do now. Natural law, for its part, cannot exist without
positive law in relation to which it shows itself off as "natural". Sec-
ondly, natural law depends upon positive law for its realization; and,
thirdly, natural law calls for positivism in law as an important means
of securing justice in the sense of certainty and equality of treatment.
On the other hand, positivism cannot dispense with natural law, since
the latter provides inspiration for the content of positive rules; accord-
ing to Professor Fuller, a law is what its creators thought it ought to be.
The reasons for keeping the two apart, however, are: (a) a sense of "sci-
entific purity" and the need to judge an ethical ideal by the particular
natural law that is being adumbrated; (b) a judge's wish to know ex-
actly at what point law ends and discretion begins; (c) it comforts a
judge to be able to shift responsibility when giving a harsh decision;
(d) natural law can make law reform palatable; and (e) it makes for sta-
bility amidst change. Conflict between natural law and positivism can
arise in either of two ways: first, in so far as positivism asserts that only
that which is identifiable by means of a formal criterion of validity is
"law" and nothing else is to be obeyed. Second, when positivism be-
comes an ideology in the sense previously explained, the courts have to
choose between it and a naturalist ideology.
Such, in the briefest outline, is the author's thesis, but it is not easy
to evaluate it without reference to a broader background. Accordingly,
it is hoped that the following digression, which approaches the question
from another angle, will not be thought out of place.'5 A rule of law,
like anything else, may be considered in two frames of thought: as it
stands for the purposes of this moment, or as an enduring phenome-
non. The main concern of the present time-frame is to identify pre-
13. The writer hopes shortly to publish an expanded version of the thesis contained
in the next few lines. It has been touched on previously in Legal Politics: Norms Behind
the Grundnorm, [1968] CAMB. L.J. 233, 255, and in The Value Study of Law, 28 MODERN
L. REV. 397, 418 (1965).
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cepts as "laws" within a given legal order, and positivists assert that this
is to be accomplished solely with reference to a formal criterion of va-
lidity which has been accepted by courts in that particular legal order.
Thus, if a proposition is embodied in statute or precedent it can be
identified as "law", and its merit or vice is irrelevant for this purpose.
In the time-frame of endurance, however, all factors (historical, moral,
social) but for which a rule would not be in existence, and continue to
exist, become an integral part of the concept of law as enduring, and
it is within this context that naturalists assert that morality, inter alia,
is part of any concept of law, i.e., of law as enduring. Thus, an immoral
statute is "law" at this moment, but it will not be "law" for very long.
The author glimpses this idea in her remark that "when a natural law
adherent says that a certain group of phenomena 'is' law, he uses the
'is' existentially, whereas a true positivist, when making a similar state-
ment, uses the 'is' merely descriptively."' 4 The genesis of a rule may in-
clude moral or social factors and, indeed, the circumstances in which
even a criterion of validity came to be accepted may reveal a built-in
moral limitation on legislative power.1 5 Professor Silving forwards a
somewhat analogous proposition when she asserts that "modern 'posi-
tivism' is predicated upon belief in a certain basic rationality of law
and of those who enact it."'16 Turning next to the continuity of a rule,
its consonance with moral ideas, adaptability, effectiveness, function
(i.e., continued fulfillment of purpose) and functioning are all part of
the concept of the living rule. At this point Professor Fuller's "inner
morality" of law is highly significant. 17 Such a concept consists of eight
requirements, namely, generality, promulgation, prospectivity, intelli-
gibility, self-consistency, prescription of possibilities, constancy through
time and congruence with official action. A moment's reflection will
reveal that none of these is necessary to the validity of a law at any given
point of time, but that they are all conditions without which law can-
not function in regulating behaviour.
In the light of this time-frame approach there is indeed little conflict
between positivists and naturalists, for the former reflect mainly in the
present time-frame and the latter in a continuum. Thus, Professor
Hart, a leading positivist, whose concept of law is that of a "legal sys-
14. H. SILVING, SOURCES OF LAW 295 (1968).
15. E.g., in 1689 the Crown in Parliament was accepted in England as the supreme legis-
lative authority in supersession to the prerogative in order to guard against any further
immoral abuse of legislative power. See also the adoption of the American Constitution.
16. H. SILVING, SOURCES OF LAw 355 (1968).
17. L. FULLER, TnE MORALITY OF LAw, chap. 2 (1964).
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tern" which is a continuing phenomenon, takes refuge in the present
time-frame when justifying his positivist outlook, thereby betraying a
basic confusion between his concept of law and his positivism. Profes-
sor Fuller, a leading naturalist, thinks exclusively in terms of endur-
ance and refuses to face awkward problems of validity here and now.18
Many more examples can be quoted to show that positivists and natu-
ralists are seldom ad idem, but are shadow-boxing on different planes.
A real issue between them does arise when naturalists enter the present
time-frame and insist that laws should be identified with reference, not
just to a formal criterion, but to a formal and moral criterion; and it
is on this narrow front, i.e., identifying laws here and now, that the
confrontation occurs. The positivists have advanced a powerful case for
confining the criterion of identification to clear-cut, formal media, such
as statute and precedent, so the onus lies on the naturalists to point out
a workable way of adding a moral criterion. It could be done, perhaps,
by international treaty embodying human and moral values on the
model of the Treaty of Rome. This establishes a supra-national law for
the European Community and limits the law-quality of national enact-
ments conflicting with it.19 It could also be accomplished through built-
in constitutional limitations;2° and moral criteria of validity might even
be evolved case by case similar to equity. Such possibilities do make the
naturalist position appear less starry-eyed than at first sight, but even so
they all depend ultimately on the co-operation of the judges. When
faced with ruthless governmental power and when "clubs are trumps",
as Hobbes put it,21 judges can do little and the naturalists would seem
to labour in vain.
The problem of statute and statutory interpretation can be related to
this time-frame idea, but the present book is concerned mainly with a
plea that there should be a set of rules of interpretation. Legal interpre-
tation is neither right nor wrong, for a word means what the law says
it means. Thus, even the "dictionary meaning" becomes the appropri-
ate meaning by virtue of legal fiat. Therefore, rules of interpretation
are of primary importance and the meaning they yield is secondary.
18. For a brief demonstration see Dias, The Value Study of Law, 28 MODERN L. REV.
397, 418-20 (1965).
19. See, e.g., N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Ondereming Van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Tariefcommissie (no. 26/62) [1963] COMMON MARKET L. Rav. 105; Costa v.
Ente Nazionale per l'Enegeria Elettrice (ENEL) (No. 6/64 [1964] COMMON MARKET L.
REv. 425.
20. E.g., I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762.




Such rules are peculiar in that they are used in conjunction with other
rules whose meaning they serve to specify. The case for having such
rules is (1) that they will provide an agreed type of comprehension and
a method of arriving at it; (2) that they enable draftsmen to know in
advance how courts will react; and (3) that they establish a criterion
with reference to which there can be such a thing as "true" meaning.
In regard to all this, it should first be noted that there is a distinction
between "statute" as a law-constitutive medium and the problem of in-
terpreting particular statutes. The book is clearly concerned with the
latter, though one would have expected a "jurisprudential" discussion
of statute to have included both. Secondly, the plea for a "law of inter-
pretation" is questionable. Clearly any rule of statute-law is designed to
operate in a continuum, since it seeks to control the indefinite future,
and this can only be achieved in terms of categories and classes. But
these are man-made and hence are bound to be casus omissi. There-
fore, viewed in the time-frame of a continuum the problem is not
essentially that of "meaning," but of "application" of a given text to
unforeseen situations. "Meaning" is an idea germane to the present
time-frame (what words mean here and now): "application" is an idea
germane to the continuum. "Meaning" should thus be oriented towards
"continuous application." The process may be analogized to the build-
ing of a brick wall; one does not simply place each brick as it comes to
hand next to the previous one, but along a guiding line indicating the
direction. With statute this guiding line is its policy extension and is
to be determined not only from the purpose behind the original enact-
ment but also from contemporary needs. The author is correct in ob-
serving that the inclusion or exclusion of the preparatory material of
statutes rests on rules, but she does not examine when the one rule or
the other should be invoked. In the case of ancient statutes, evidence
of the original circumstances that gave rise to its enactment is of little
help if they no longer obtain.2 2 Thirdly, a plea for rules of interpreta-
tion is not likely to succeed unless an indication of the type of rules that
are envisaged are forwarded, for grave difficulties are encountered due
to the sheer slipperiness of words. The very word "meaning" is ambig-
uous, for it connotes both reference ("I mean to refer to this thing")
and purpose ("I mean to do so and so"). No one can fix meanings to
cope with all future applications, since problems will inevitably arise




in the fringe area of unsettled usages that surround every word. Hence,
rules prescribing the means of determining meanings will be of little
value. A rule which says that, e.g., the "plain meaning" is to be adopted,
is useless because, as Lord Blackburn pointed out, "The cases in which
there is real difficulty are those in which there is a controversy as to what
the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words, used with reference
to the subject-matter, is."23 Again, a certain statute required that a tax-
payer, who submitted a false tax-return, should be penalized "treble the
tax which he ought to be charged under this Act." The Court of Appeal
was of the opinion that the "plain meaning" of the statute required the
taxpayer to pay treble the amount which he failed to declare, i.e., treble
£14 5s.,24 whereas the House of Lords reasoned the statute meant treble
the total tax assessment, i.e., treble £139 lls. 6d.25 What sort of rule
would have avoided this divergence of opinion? It is, if anything, a
problem of drafting, not of rules. Very often different meanings are
attached to words according to vital policy considerations, consequently
any rule which states that words shall be construed according to policy
automatically deprives itself and all other rules of further value.
Precedent is dealt with less extensively than statute. The comparison
of statutory interpretation and precedent interpretation is unconvinc-
ing. The author states, for instance, that "the distinctive treatment of
the interpretation of statutes and that of precedents is a matter of legal
fiat and not merely one of inherent qualities of these forms of law. 2 6
Such an assertion appears to suggest that the differences are artificial
and possibly .of minor importance. With case law the task is that of ex-
tracting from some unique event a statement of fact at a level of suffi-
cient generality to enable it to control similar type situations in the
future. How broadly or narrowly such control can be effected depends
upon the level of generality and, as the author truly remarks, facts are
statable at various levels. With statute, on the other hand, the task is
not one of extracting different statements of facts from a unique event,
but of placing different constructions on a single given statement.
This difference, it is urged, is indeed inherent in the two forms
of law and is crucial. Consequently, the application of stare decisis to
statutory interpretation is to be deplored even though the author re-
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23. Leader v. Duffy, [18881 13 A.C. 294, 301.
24. Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Hinchy, [19591 2 Q.B. 357.
25. Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Hinchy, [1960] A.C. 748.
26. H. SILVING, SOURCES OF LAW 17-18 (1968).
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gards it as a possible solution to certain problems.27 The sole advantage
of stare decisis in this connection is that once an interpretative decision
has been given, legislators have notice of the judicial meaning. The au-
thor's general opinion is that a combination of code-cum-case-law is de-
sirable, and the respective functions of precedent in civil and common
law countries are contrasted. In the former, case law must be fitted into
a scheme of comprehensive codification and is thus subsidiary and il-
lustrative. In the latter, this is not so, and the suggestion is offered that
it would be helpful to have a restatement of common law technique
rather than, or perhaps in addition to, restatements of particular
branches.
With regard to custom, a distinction is drawn between custom as le-
gal continuity in the face of change and customary law which consists
of particular rules referring to customs. 2 In the former sense customary
law is the legal corollary of evolution.29 Custom is said to be composed
of two elements, a factual one, which -is the repetition of outward acts,
and a psychological one, which is the attitude of those performing such
acts; but it is not clear to which of the two meanings of custom they re-
late. It is submitted that the preservation of continuity in a legal order
is dependent on the courts. One manifestation of "justice" is that like
cases should be adjudicated uniformly, thereby giving rise in time to
lines of similar decisions, which thereby evolve into principles of law.
The process of keeping the above abreast of social change is inseparably
linked with the "custom of the courts", i.e., judicial practice, which
identifies custom as an element of legal continuity with precedent. But
this point is not touched on by the author. Another aspect, which is
largely ignored, is that of particular customs as laws. If one asks the
question why customs were originailly accepted as laws and why customs
continue to be accepted as laws, it will be seen that, with regard to the
first question, local customary practices were originally accepted by
judges in the absence of any other guides because the corpus of law had
not filled out sufficiently. A further influence was the desire to win and
preserve local confidence and not to defeat settled expectations founded
on local practices. The early judges were, therefore, only concerned to
see whether practices exerted sufficient local pressure to conform, and
it is in this connection that the factual repetition of outward acts and
27. Id. at 38. For judicial condemnation, see Wright v. Walford, [1955] 1 Q.B. 363, 374;
R. v. Bow Road Justices, ex parte Adedigba, [1968] 2 Q.B. 572.
28. H. SILVING, SOURCES OF LAW 136 (1968).
29. Id. at 133.
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the psychological urge towards conformity find their setting. By not
making such distinctions, the discussion of custom loses a good deal of
point.
The book proceeds to the philosophy of nature as a source of law, in
connection with which the attitude of courts towards mistake, religious
belief and scientific freedom is considered; and to the philosophy of
law as a source of law, which deals with the influence of legal ideology.
Other subsidiary matters are also dealt with, but it would exceed the
province of this commentary to enter into them. Throughout the book
there are many insights and thought-provoking remarks, but the over-
riding judgment must be that the analyses scarcely go far enough and,
in any case, are couched in such abstract language that it is often diffi-
cult to distill the point.
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